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ABSTRACT
This paper presents and utilizes a new general equilibrium simulation
model of capital income taxation. Its chief advantage over existing models
of the effects of taxation is that it recognizes that agents may adjust
their financial behavior in response to changes in the way that capital
income is taxed. By integrating a structural treatment of portfolio choice
and financial markets into a standard multi—sector model of taxation, the
model can trace the general equilibrium impact of these financial adjustments
and calculate the tax—induced changes in the allocation of factors and output
as well as the distributional effects of any tax change.
The model is used to simulate the impact of completely indexing the
tax system for inflation. The results indicate there would be significant
financial adjustment in response to indexing. A large shift in the distri—
bution of private risk bearing accompanies a slight reallocation of the
capital stock away from owner—occupied housing toward its other uses and
a substantial change in the ownership of the housing stock by income class.
Allinall, indexing the tax system of an economy like the U.S.in1977
seems to lead to an efficiency gain, slightly hurts the lowest income
classes, and substantially improves the welfare of the highest income
groups. The simulation results should, however, be considered tentative
due to uncertainty about the values of several parameters and the relatively
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(612) 373—3607I. Introduction
This paper presents and utilizes a new general eqtiflbrium simulation
model of capital income taxation. Its chief advantageover existing models
of taxation is that it recognizes thatagents imay adjust their financial
behavior in response to changes in theway that capital income is taxed.
The model can trace the general equilibrium impact of these financial
adjustments and calculate the tax-induced changes in the allocation of
factors and production as well as the distributional effects ofany tax
change.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II providesas background
a brief review of the important antecedent literature. In Section III I
describe the structure of the model, while in Section IV theparameterization
and control solution of the model is detailed, Section Vuses the model to
simulate the general equilibrium impact of changing thepresent system of
taxing capital income under inflation to a perfectly indexed taxsystem.
Some conc1uding remarks are made in Section VI.—2—
II. Review of the Literature
General equilibrium aniJ.ysis of the effects of taxation began with
the static, two—sector, two—factors--of—production model of Rarberger [1959,
1962, 19661.1 In the original version of the model, two competitive indus—
tries employ two factors which are perfectly mobile between the sectors, but
are fixed in total supply; the. factors are paid a return which, including
taxes paid, is equal to their respective marginal products. All consumers
(and the government by implication) have identical homothetic preference
functions as to the two goods. This formulation allows one to account directly
for the interdependence among all product and factormarkets.2
The Harberger model is especially suited for the analysis of differential
taxation of either final outputs or factors. The effect of a differential
tax on factor returns and the commodity price ratio is shown to depend on
the relative factor intensity of production in the two sectors, the substitu—
tability of factors in production, and the extent of demand substitutability.
If all consumers and the government do not have identical homothetic preference
functions, then any shifting of income among these groups would alsohave
repercussions for relative prices since the composition of aggregatedemand
would change. The personal incidence of a differential tax depends on the personal
distribution of factor endowments and consumption preferences. If all individuals
have identical factor endowments, then any changes in factor returns have noincome
distributional effect from the sources of income side. If consumption preferences
do not vary, then relative price variations do not have any distributional
implications from the uses of income side.
HarbergerTs methodology was to solve the general equilibrium system
analytically, making the problem tractable by assuming linearity or using a
local approximation, and by limiting the dimensions of the problem. Shoven-3-
and Whalley l972 showed that such a general equilibrium system could be
solved explicitly without sirnplifications, using an appropriate solution
algorithm. A variety of functional forms for production and demand func-
donscould then bespecified. The comparative static effects of a tax
changeare found by simply coinpring the pre- and post—change equilibria.
The flexibility of this method of solution allowed Shaven and Whalley to
disaggregatethe general equilibrium model more extensively than had been
previously attempted. Disaggregation of production allows a more detailed
calculation of the inter-sectoral misallocation caused by, for example, dif-
ferential factor tax application. Disaggregation of consumers groups per-
mits a detailed assessment of changes in the personal distribution of
income.
In the most recent use of this technique, 16 consumer goods (counting saving
as one such good) are distinguished. Using input—output information, a vec-
tor of consumer goods is translated into a vector of 19 produced goods,
which in turn are produced by labor and capital. Twelve consumer classes
are distinguished on the basis of differing marginal personal tax rates,
factor endowments, and consumption preferences. Although it is larger,
the Fullerton-Shoven--Whalley3 model has the samebasicstructure as the simple
Harberger model.
Some recent research, though, has focussed on a number of potentially
important aspects of the capital income tax environment which are outside
the scope of a Harberger-type model. For example, one characteristic of
the Harberger-type models is that in an equilibrium situation all individuals
face the same relative rates of tax on capital placed in the varioussectors.
The pattern of marginal products of capital is such that—4—
theafter—tax rates of return on capital in all sectors are equal for all
individuals; each individual can be thought of as owning a proportionate share
of all the economy's capital goods. Note that this kind of equilibriuni would be
impossible if the relative rates of tax on capital goods differed for different
individuals. Feldsteiri and Slemrod [19781 point out that this is in fact the case
in the U.S., where there is (i) progressive personal taxation with marginal
rates ranging from below the corporate rate to above the corporate rate, and
(ii)the opportunityto substantially reduce personal taxation through corporate
retainedearnings. In this situation corporate—source capital income may be
taxed more or less heavily than non—corporatecapital income depending on
one'sax bracket. If corporateequity and other capitalincome sources were
perfect substitutes for other than tax reasons, then we would expect to observe
that in equilibrium any individual would invest entirely in corporate equity or
enitrely in the alternative asset, but never both; this specialization will occur
whenever the relative tax on two types of investment differs for different groups.
In order to explain the observed tendency for investors to hold diversified port—
folios, an explicit portfolio balance relationship is required.
Ideally, a model should specify the sources of risk in the economy, individuals'
attitude toward risk—bearing (expressed in the form of cardinal utility functions),
and theopportunities for portfolio diversification. In such a model, portfolios
willdiffer by consumer class. Therefore, for certain problems it may be incorrect
to assume that all capital owners bear the burden of tax changes identically.
The work of Stiglitz [1973] and King [1974], building on the classic paper
of Modigliani and Miller [1958), made clear that any analysis of corporation
taxation must consider the financial flexibility that corporations—5-
have. Interest paid to debt-holders is deductible from corporate taxable
income, and dividends are taxed differently than retained earnings so that
the effective tax on equity earnings depends on the capital structure and the
payout policy of the corporation.When Harberger and Shaven-
Whalley calculate the total effective tax on corporate-source capital income,
they consider the financial structure of the sector, but when the effects of
a tax change are simulated, financial policy is assumed to be unaffected.4
Papers by Balleritine andMcLure[l978 and Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski
El979 have investigated the effects of corporation income tax in a world
of flexible corporate financial policy, but neither posed the question in
a gneral equilibrium model with differentially taxed wealth owners and
several production sectors.
This concludes the overview of the important antecedent literature. The
research since Harberger may, it seems, be divided into two categories. The
first category features highly stylized, usually partial equilibrium,models
that focus on one aspect of capital income taxation, such as the implications
of a progressive tax system or the role of corporate financial decisions.
In the second category is the work of Shoven and his collaborators, where
a large general quilibrium model is constructed as a framework for the
analysis of a wide range of taxation issues. However, the Shoven model,
being fundamentally identical to the smaller Harberger model, inadequately
treats several of the important issues raised in the first group of papers.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the development of a new model
which is general equilibrium in the tradition of the second category of re—
search, but can also offer insight into the issues raised by the first category
of the recent literature.LI I. Descr of the Model
111.1. Distinguishing Characteristics
Inthis section, the structure of the general equilibrium model with
financial behavior (GEFB) is presented. Before proceeding to a more detailed
discussion of its features, its distinguishing characteristics are briefly
noted here.
1.Explicit treatment of riskiness. Income from capital is not
certain, and individuals are risk-averse. Individuals allocate
their wealth among the available asset types on the basis of
optimal portfolio considerations.
2.Portfolio choice under progressive taxation. Since different
agents face different tax rates, they willhold different port-
folios.5 Thus, for incidence results, it is not generally
true that all capital owners will be ideatically affected to the
extent that they owncapital.
3.Endogenous tax rates. An individual's marginal tax rate is not
fixed, but rather depends on the amount of his taxable income.
This is an important consideration in the decision of how much
financial leverage to acquire, since the marginal tax saving from
borrowing declines with greater borrowing in a progressive tax
systern.
4.Tax-exempt bonds. These securities are a potentially significant
outlet for the wealth of high tax bracket individuals, and are
included in the available asset menu.
5.Rental and owned housing. The capital income from these two ways of
consuming housing are subject to very differenttaxation schemes. In—7—
fhis model the twotypes of housing are treated separately.
6.Corporate financial policy. Theimportance of the ability to alter
corporate financial decisions inresponse to the tax environment
has already been noted. TheGEFB model can accomodateendogenous
corporate decisions in a number of ways.
III. 2.sk,RiskAvondPortfolioChoice
Eachagent in the economy is endowed witha fixed amount of capital
goods and a fixed amountoflabor in efficiency units. Thecapital goods
maybeused in the production ofgoods forsale or in the production of
housing services to be consumedby the owner. Labor isinelastically hired
Thut to firms in return for awage.
The production functions ofall goods other thanowner-occupied housing
are stochastic. The stochastic
element, though, refers only to thecontrj—
bution to production of thecapital input; thus the marginalproduct of labor
is Certain.6
In the standard Harberger
model, the individual implicitly facesa two..
stagedecision process. In the firststage, his endowment of factors is allocated
in order to maximize the flow of
income, or, equivalently, wealth atsome point
in time. In he secondstage, the income flow is allocated
among consumption
goods in order to maximizeutility. In the GEFB model, a similarbut modi-
fied two-stage decisionprocess is envisioned. In the firststage, the
individualconstructs a portfolio to maximizethe expected utility of the
stream of income, or,
equivalently, the expected utility ofsomefuture
period's wealth. Once theuncertainty is resolved and actual incomeis
revealed, the income is allocated
among consumption goods to maximize the
utility obtained.—8—
The following special form of the first—stage maximarid will beconsidered:
- V
where y is the expected flow of after—tax income, is a tradeoff coefficient,
V is the variance of after—tax income, and K is the capital endowment.This for—
mulation has the desirable feature that the portfolio demand functions implied by
its maximization are identical to the optimal rules for an individual who has only
capital income and is faced with a frictionless capital market andaninfinitesimal
planninghorizon.7
In the second stage, realized income is allocated among the consumption goods.
Since only homothetic utility functions are considered, maximizing the expected
utility of income in the first stage also maximizes the expected utilityof
cons umption.
111.3. Model Structure
In this section the overall structure of the model will be laid out. In
subsequent sections, more detailed attention will be paid tocertain sectors of the
model and their parameterization.
The economy's agents are considered to consist of nine stylized types,each
representing a different income class. The agents vary intheir (fixed) endowment
of capital and labor as well as their preferences for consumption goods.All mdi—
viduals are assumed to have the same coefficient of risk aversion. Becausethere
is a progressive tax system, the different categories of individuals,called "in-
come groups" for convenience, will have different marginal taxrates and the after—
tax riskiness of assets will also differ among individuals.
The model'has production functions for each of four goods: food,rental
housing, owner—occupied housing, and a composite good produced bycorporations.
Each income class has a demand function for each good, which depends onreal income,
relative prices, and the tastes of the income group.—9—
There are asset demand functions of each class for each of six assets:
food—sector capital, rental housing, owner—occupied housing, corporate equity, tax-
able debt, which is assumed to be riskiess, and tax—exempt debt, which has some un-
certainty of return. These functions are derived from the first—order conditionsfor
the maximization of expected utility, and include as arguments the capital endowment,
the after—tax expected real rate of returns on the available assets, the after—tax
variance—covariance structure, and the degree of risk aversion. The tax system is
assumed to regard net losses symetrically with net gains, and the marginal tax rate
is assumed constant in the calculation of after—tax variances and covariances.
There are market—clearing equations for all assets and all goods. The supply
equations of different assets have different characteristics. For housingand food—
sector capital, the supply simply equals the capital stock used in production. For
corporate equity, asset supply is the equity—capital ratio, which is endogenous,
multiplied by the corporate capital stock. The supply of tax—exempt debt is fixed
by state and local governments, and is exogenous to the model. The supplyof taxable
debt is the sum of the exogenously given supply of federal government debt and
the amount of corporate debt, which is equal to the corporate debt—capital ratio
times the corporate capital stock. Since both the debt—capital ratio and the cor-
porate capital stock are endogenous, the total supply of taxabledebt is also endo—
genous. The market—clearing equations for goods simply statethat demand equal
production.
The model also includes equations for the allocation of labor to sectors (equali-
zation of marginal revenue product), factor supply identities, and determination of
real income and taxable income by income group. There is also a corporate earnings
exhaustion equation, which ensures that total corporate earnings net of corporation
income tax accrue either to corporate debt holders or to equity holders.
The basic structure of the model is thus similar to the standard general—10-.
equilibriummodel oftaxo tion,except that the sinpie capital allocation equ3 Lions
are replaced by explicit portfolio demand equations and market clearing equations
foreach of several financial assets. Other distinguishing aspects of the model
are discussed further below.
111.4. E2genous Tax Rates
Thetotal tax liability and marginal tax rates in the various kinds of income
are calculated by appropriately reducing the income flows of the group to a per tax
return basis, calculating taxable income, and applying the actual patternof tax
brackets and rates that were applicable in1977.8 Taxable income differs from
real income in a number of significant ways. First of all, certain deductions and
exemptions are allowed. The average value of all such deductions and exemptions
other than for interest and property tax payments is considered to be fixed and is
entered as a subtraction from income. The amount of allowable deductions for interest
and property tax paid is endogenously deteined using the simulatedportfolios.9
Second, nominal interest received rather than real interest received (and paid)is
included in taxable income. Third, the imputed income from owned housing is not
included in taxable income, though a small fraction of the nominal rise in housing
values due to inflation is included in order to reflect the partial taxation of
capital gains on residences. Similarly, a fraction of the inflation—induced capital
gains on other assets isincluded.10 The income from equity, after corporation tax,
is only partially included in taxable income to reflect the fact that retained
earnings are virtually exempt from personal taxation. The fraction included in
taxable income is equal to d + (1 —d)c,whered is the payout ratio and c
is the ratio of the effective tax on capital gains to the tax on dividends. The
value of c will be less than one due to the exclusion of one—half of long—term
capital gains, then value of the deferral of tax payments until realization ofthe
gain, and the opportunity to avoid tax by bequeathing appreciatedstock. For presentpurposes the value of c is taken to be one--eighth. The income from state
and local securities is not part of the taxable income. Finally, there is an
addition to individual taxable income (for rental housing and food—sector capital
owned) and to corporation taxable income (for corporate capital) to reflect the
mismeasurement of capital income due to historical cost depreciation and certain
inventory accounting methods. Since depreciation on owner—occupied housing is not
deductible from taxable income, inflation does not thereby cause any additional
tax to be paiddueto consuming owned housing services.
Once the total taxable income is determined, the marginal tax rate on a dollar
of taxable income (call it 'tt" )iscalculated by referring to the tax tables.
The real after—tax rate of return earned by the ith asset is then equal to
r. —t(r.t),wherer. is the before—tax real rate of return and r. is the 1_ :1. 1 1
addition to taxable income from holding one dollar of the ith asset. For all the
reasons mentioned above r1T may differ from r .Forexample, the after—tax real
rate of return to holding a nominal debt security is rB —t(rB+ H) ,since
a dollar of debt yields rB + 11(the nominal interest rate) of taxable income.
111.5.Tax—ExemptBonds
In the modal there is a fixed supply of debt issued by state and local govern—
ments, the interest from which is exempt from federal income taxation. rney are
presumed here to be risky assets, though they are significantly less risky than
corporate equity, rental housing, or food—sector capital.
Individuals cannot borrow at the tax—exempt interest rate; that is, they must
hold a non—negative quantity of these securities. An important question is whether
individuals can simultaneously hold tax—exempt bonds and receive a tax deduction for
interest paid on their outstanding borrowing. The tax law states that individuals.
cannot borrow for the express purpose of buying tax—exempt bonds and still claim
the interest expense as a deduction. However, it is possible for an individual— 12—
todeduct luterest payments bi1eatthe se time holding r3x—e<errpt debt. The
IRSpositionis apparently that wheneveran outstandingobligation is not directly
connected with a personal or business loan, it will be inferred that its purpose
isto carry tax—exempt assets, and therefore its interest expense will be disallowed
asatax deduction. However, the Tax Court and other courts have ruled that in order
to be disallowed the debt and the tax-exempt property must somehow be related in
11
purpose.
For present purposes what is needed is an operational rule which approximately
captures the reglations' effective limitation on interest expense deductions when
aportfolio includes tax—exempt bonds. We have chosen the rule that the IRS will
disallow that fraction of any individual's interest deductions equal to the ratio
of the value of tax—exempt bonds to total net wealth. Under this rule, the net
cost of borrowing depends on the amount of wealth invested in tax—exempt bonds;
also, the after—tax return of tax—exempt bonds depends on how leveraged one's
portfolio is.
111.6. Housing
It is assumed that the housing sector produces housing services from capital
with no labor input. Though the omission of labor is certainly a stylization of
the production process, it is not an unwarranted exaggeration. Aaron [1972] notes
that housing services require the combination of more capital per unit of labor
than does any major category of consumer or investment goods. Using a detailed
input—output raatrix, Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley [1978] calculate the
capital—labor ratio of producing housing services to be approximately 20 times
higher than the economy—wide capital—labor ratio, and 15 times higher than any
other major sector.12
It is further assumed that the services from rented housing and the services from— 13—
owner—occupiedhousing are considered by consumers to be distinct commodities.
In actuality, though their characteristics tend to differ, the distinction is
not absolute. Which type of housing will be chosen by a given family unit
(they may in many cases effectively be mutually exclusive commodities), and the
quantity consumed given that choice, will depend on tastes as well as the
relative price of rented versus owner--occupied housing. If all the individuals
within an income group are aggregated, the aggregate relative consumption of the
two types of housing services may be represented as a smooth function of the rela-
tive price of the two goods and the distribution of tastes within the class (see
Rosen and Rosen [1980)).
The set of available assets includes rented and owner—occupied housing. It is
assumed that the production of services from rental housing capital is subject to
stochastic influences, and the production of services from owner—occupied housing
is not stochastic. In expected value terms, the two production functions are
identical. The model then has a market clearing equation for rental housing, where
the sum of the nine income groups' demand for it as an asset must equal the stock
necessary to supply the rental services demanded by consumers at the equilibrium
relative prices. For owner—occupied housing, the situation is somewhat different.
For each income class, there is an additional constraint that the desired stock
must produce a flow of services equal to the amount of services demanded by that
class. Thus, there is implicitly a separate market for each class in which each
individual rents the housing services from himself. For each class, there is a
shadow price of consuming housing. This price has three components: (i) the
pecuniary income foregone through holding capital in housing rather than another
asset, (ii) the cost of maintenance and depreciation, and (iii) any attendant
tax liabi]ities or rebates.14
111.7. The Government Sector
One function of the government J.s relative price stabiUztion. In the
absence of government intervention, the market-clearing pattern of relative
prices would depend on the state of the world that obtains. In this economy,
though, the governmentmaintainsstocks of all commodities, andpledgesto
defenda particular relative price structure by buying all production at
these prices and selling that amount of each commodity such that theseannounced
pricessupport markets that clear. The relative price structure that the govern-
ment supports is the one that would obtain if realized production was equal to
the expected value of production in each sector. Of course which prices are
supported depends on the allocation of capital and labor by sector. This
arrangement leads to market clearing with no intervention necessary if the
expected value of all sector's production obtain, and which may require some
use of the government's commodity stocks if they do not. Note that by doing
this the government does not insulate agents from the production uncertainty,
but rather confines the effects of the uncertainty to incomes, while making
relative prices nonstochastic)3
The government must also collect taxes to finance its expenditure,
which has three components. The first is spending on goods and services,
which is fixed. The second component is interest payments, which vary accord
ing to the equilibrium interest rates on government debt. The third component
is the cost of the price supports discussed above. Since uncertain capital
income comprises part of the tax base, total tax revenue is also uncertain.
The government constructs its tax schedules so that the expected value of
its tax revenues equals its expenditure commitments. Anydivergenceof actual— 15—
taxrevenues from this expected value is made up by a special tax levied in
proportion to thevalue of eachagent's tax liability.
Whentheeconomic environment changes so that expected revenues no
longerequal desired expenditure,the government alters the tax rate schedules
to reestablish the equality. Thus the expected value of the stochastic tax
transfers will always be zero.
111.8. Corporate Financial Policy
Corporate financial policy represents another dimension of possible
behavioral response to changes in the tax environment. Modigliani and Miller
[1958] demonstrated the irrelevance to firm market value of corporate financial
decisions in the absence of taxes, and speculated that financial flexibility
would allow firms to avoid any corporation income tax by issuing debt instead
of equity and to avoid any tax on dividends by retaining earnings within the
corporation. Much recent work, some of which as alluded to earlier, has
re—examined the interaction between capital income taxation and corporate
finance taking into account, among other things, the personal taxation ofdebt
interest, the effective capital gains tax on retained earnings, and progressive
taxation.
In •Slemrod [1980j14 I discuss several methods of introducing the financial
flexibility of corporations into a GEFB model. Because of the lack of a consensus
about just what characterizes a capital market equilibrium in the environment
described above, no simple procedure-will becompletelysatisfactory. Nevertheless,
in that work I utilized a procedure which is in the spirit of several theoretical
treatments of corporate financial behavior in the presence of taxes and is
consistentwiththe econometric evidence concerning financial policy
behavior. I will briefly describe in turn the procedure, its- 16-
theoreticaljustification, and the relevant econometric evidence.
The suggested procedure is to set both inrportarit corporate financial
decisions (debt-equity and payout) to be functions of critical "tax cost"
values. Behind this procedure is a theory which envisions the corporation maxitniz-
ingitsvalue by balancing the net tax advantages of its financial structure
withtheother costs and benefits of the policy. For debt-equity policy,
the cost that offsets the tax advantages of debt may be real bankruptcy costs
or agency costs. For dividend policy, the tax advantages of retainedearnings must
bebalanced against the transactions cost of receiving income in the form of
capital gains, the signalling value of dividends, constraints on firm growth,
and the law which inhibits the unwarranted accumulation of funds within the
corporation.
One common element of these non-tax factors is the difficulty of quanti-
fying them and explicitly relating their magnitude to the financial policies
chosen. Rather than arbitrarily constructing such measures, I instead use
econometrically estimated responses of financial policy to the tax cost of
the policies involved. The presumption is that these measured responses are
the result of an optimal balancing of tax considerations with the othe-r
implications of the financial decision.
The estimated responsiveness of the debt-equity ratio comes from King
C1978], where he finds an elasticity of 0.8 with respect to the tax cost
variable tc(l_tBY ,wheretis the rate of corporation income tax and
(l_t)A is a weighted average of (one minus) the marginal tax rate of
equity holders. This value measures the cost of raising new capital through
debt versus new share issue. The estimated responsiveness of the payout ratio
is taken from Sleinrod rl930, where the work of Brittain [l966 was updated.— 17—
Theestimated elasticity of the payout ratio with respect to the tax cost
of dividends, (tD -
tRE) (the weighted average of the difference in the
tax rate on dividends minus the effective tax rate on retained earnings),
was found there to be —0.79.- 18-
IV.Pararneterization and the Control Solution
IV.1.Parameterizin gthe Mode I
The model is parameterized to represent a stylized U.S. economy of
the year 1977. That year is chosen because it is the most recent year for
which detailed tax return information is available. Unfortunately, though,
the best iriforrciation available about certain key values refers to earlier
years. Thus, it is often necessary to update and adjust data to represent
the 1977 situation.
One crucial set of values for which the best data available is severely
outdated is the distribution of wealth. The most accurate source for this
as well as for the structure of portfolios by income and wealth class remains the
Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consuners (SFCC),
which refers to year—end ]962. The SFCC disaggregates the wealth and portfolio
information into nine income classes. In order to obtain a wealth distribu-
tion for 1977, it is assumed here that the relative distribution of wealth
by real income class has not changed since 1962. The SFCC income classes are thus
inflated by a factor of three, which is approximately the factor by which
per capita disposable personal income rose between 1962 and 1977.15 The result-
ing nine income classes for the 1977 model are as follows: $0-$9,000, $9,000—
$15,000, $15 ,000-$22,500, $22,500-$30,000, $30,000-$45 ,000, $45,000-$75,000,
$75,000-$150,000, $150,000-$300,000, and over $300,000. The nine stylized indivi-
duals in the economy represent average individuals of each of these income classes.
The relative distribution of wealth among these classes is assumed to be the same
16 as the relative distribution among the equivalent 1962 classes.
Under the model's assumptions the relative gross remuneration of labor
will equal the relative endowment of labor in efficiency units. To approxi—- 19-
matethis distribution, I use the 1977 Statistics of Incomemeasure of wages
andsalaries received by taxpaying units in each income class,supplemented
by adding one-half of the net return to business,profession, farm, andpart-
nership as an approximation to the labor input share in self—employment.17
The resulting distribution of labor is given in Table A-i of theAppendix.
In order to obtain the value of total private wealth, the ratio ofprivate
wealth to labor units as of 1962 was calculated and then applied to the total labor
endowmEnt in 1977. That procedure yielded 4.24 billion units,or $4.24 billion
worth, of private wealth.'3 As mentioned above, the distribution of that wealth
is determined according to the relative ownership of wealth from SFCC.
The resulting wealth distribution is also shown in Table A-i of theAppendix.
Because the utility function of each class is assumed to beCobb--Douglas,
knowing the share of consumption that goes to each good is sufficient for
parameterizing the function. The source for spending shares is the Bureau
of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure InterviewSurvey, 1972-73. The
income classes delineated in thesurvey are inflated to refer to 1977.19
The food share is computed as the ratio of expenditureon food at home to
current consumption expenditures; the rental housing share is the ratio of
expenditure on rented dwellings to current consumption expenditures. The
appropriateshare for owner-occupied housing cannot be straighforwardly
obtained from the expenditure survey, since thetruecost of this behavior
isnot correctly measured. To obtain the true cost ofowner-occupied housing,
I apply a conversion factor to the reported spending equal to the ratio of
actual spencing to reported spending.2° The highest income bracket forwhich
results are reported in the expendituresurvey is $50,000 and over ($75,000
and over in 1977 dollars). This blursany possible distinction in the con-— 20—
sutnptionpreferences of the top three income classes. Rather than use the re—
ported expenditure shares of the over $75,000 group for all of the top three
classes (and implicitly assume an income elasticity of one in this range), the
shares of spending of the top three classes are found by extrapolating the share
21
of the sixth income class to higher incomes using estimated income elasticities.
The resulting shares for food, rental and owned housing and, as a residual, the
corporate good, are displayed in Table A—2 of the Appendix.
The effective corporation income tax rate is calculated by dividing 1977
corporate profits without inventory valuation or capital consumption adjustment
into toial 1977 corporate profits tax liability; this yields a value of .41.
The property tax rate of .0154 is calculated by dividing total property
tax payments in 1975 ($51.49 billion) by total assessed value of property in
that year ($1063.9 billion) and applying an estimated percentage of assessed value
to market value (.327).22
The aggregate corporate debt—equity ratio of .721 is calculated by dividing
the flow of funds estimate of the 1977 value of corporate debt by the value of
corporate equity ($749.7 billion divided by $1039.5 billion).
The payout ratio of .544 is found by dividing dividend payments in 1977 by
corporate profits after inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment
($42.1 billion divided by $77.3 billion).
The anticipated rate of inflation is taken to be 6 per cent, which is the
average annual increase in the CPI between 1975 and 1977.
The iaismeasuremant of corporate taxable income due to inflation is
calculated to be .00515 dollars of additional taxable income per dollar of corporate
capital for each percentage point of inflation. For example, a six per cent rate— 21—
ofinflation will cause a $46.33 billion (.00515 x 6 x 1.5 x 1012) overstatement
of corporate profits on a corporate capital stock valued at $1.5 trillion. This
coefficient was calculated using estimates of the overstatement of taxable profits
taken from Feldstein and Summers [1979] and values of corporate fixed capital and
inventories. The desired coefficient, call it d,shouldmake the equation
E =dirKcorrect, where E is the profit overstatement, iris the inflation
rate, and Kis the value of corporate capital. Solving for d , comesto
.00512 for 1977, and as an average over the period 1970 to 1977, comes to .00519.
I therefore use .00515 to represent d for corporate capital as well as food—
sector capital and rental housing capital.
Since most government securities are not directly held by households, the
appropriate value of these stocks in a model with rio financial institutions is
problematic. I have chosen values of $100 billion of state and local securities,
$200 billion of federal government securities. These values are approximately
1.25 times the reported household holdings of these assets in 1977.
The measure of risk aversion, ,istaken to be three for all income groups.
This value was chosen since equilibria calculated using this value yielded simulated
risk premiums consistent with observed magnitudes, and because it is compatible with
some recent research.23 There is little empirical basis for choosing the variance—
covariance structure of the assets. For these simulations I will assume all covari—
ances to be zero, and the average after—tax variances of the assets to be .07 for
corporate equity, .05 for rental housing, .12 for food—sector capital, and .02
for tax—exempt bonds. Of course the methodology can handle any variance-covariance
structure, including one with non—zero off—diagonal elements.
The exponents on capital input in the Cobb—Douglas production functions
are set at .207 for the corporate sector and .111 for the food—related sector.- —
IV.2.The Control Solution
With this parameterization, the model is solved for an equilibrium solu-
tion using a modified Gauss-Seidel algorithm. The equilibrium values ofsome
ofthekey variables are presented in Table 1.Notethat the expected real returns
givenin the table are net of any coi:porat ion income andproperty tax pay-
ments, but are before personal tax payments. The choice of simple function
specifications and realistic parameters makes it impossible to reproduce
exactlyall the actual 1977 pric:p.s and allocations, it is reassuring, though,
that the model solution yields an allocation of factors, production,and
relative prices which is closeto what the actual 1977 economylooked like.
The calculated expected rates of return are compatible withactual
observations. The actual 1977 nominal interest rate on corporate debt was
.080 for Aaa bonds and .090 for Baa-rated bonds, compared to the model result
of .104. The difference may be attributed to the model'santicipated infla-
tion rate of 6 per cent, which may be an overestimate of actual long-term inflation
expectations in that year. The predicted nominal rate on tax—exempt bond is .061,
compared to Standard and Poor's yield index in 1977 of .056, again a slight
overestimate. The expected real rate of return to equity that the model calculates
is .106. That is somewhat higher than theaverage annual rate of return on the
Standard and Poor's composite index of New York Stock Exchange equitiesover the
period 1926-1977, which is .OSi.24 However, .106 is substantially higher than the
realized real rate of return on equities in the decade preceding 1977. All
in all, .105 seems a not too unreasonable though perhaps optimisticreading of
the expected return on equity in 1977.
The equilibrium solution includes the portfolio holdings of each income
class. This information is not reproduced in detail here, thoughsome23 —
TABLE1
EQUILIBRIlJ1 VALUES OF KEY VARIABLES IN SINULATED 1917 ECONOMY
Expected real rate of return on Corporate Equity .106
Expected real rate of return on Food—Sector Capital .082
Expected real rate of return on Rental Housing .090
Expected real rate of return on TaxableDebt .044
Expectedreal rate of return on Tax—Exeopt Debt .001
Corporate Capital Stock 1439.8
Corporate Equity 865.6
Food-'Sector Capital Stock 260.0
Rental Housing Stock 170.5
Owner—Occupied Housing Stock 1418.1
Note: All rates of return are net ofany corporation income tax and property
tax payments, but are before payIent ofany individual income tax liability.
characteristics deserve note. As expected, the ownership of equity is skewed toward
the higher income classes. The top three income classes (over $75,000income), which
are presumed to account for 27% of private wealth,own 43.9% of the equity. This
is consistent with available data on dividendsreceived, which indicate that these
classes get approximately 37% of all dividends.25Owner—occupied housing is much
less concentrated among the higher incomeclasses, with 79.5% of the stock owned by
taxpaying units of $45,000 or less in income. The ownership oftax—exempt securities
is limited to the top two classes. The lowerseven classes own positive amounts
of riskiess debt, while thetop two classes are net borrowers of funds. In fact,
these highly—taxed classes have a debt positionamounting to 26.2% of their net
wealth.- 24-
V.Arilndexed Tax System -SimulationResults
V.1. ConstantCorporateFinancial Policy
As is well knowr by now, the U.S. system of taxing capital income is
decidedly non-neutral with respect to inflation. The problem arises because
in the presence of inflation real capital income is mis-measured. Nominal
interest received is treated as income with no deduction for the real loss
in the value of the principal. Similarly, nominal interest payments are
fully deductible. Increases in nominal asset value that do not correspond
to real value increases are subject to capital gains tax if and when these
ga[iis are realized. Also, historical cost depreciation rules and certain
inventory accounting methods lead to an overstatement of real netearnings.26
The mismeasurement of capital income does not uniformly apply to all
assets. Thus inflation alters the pattern of real after-tax rates of return
available. This in turn causes a readjustment of portfolios and a shift in
the allocation of capital to production sectors, which affects the pre-tax
return on assets. The tax penalty (or benefit) from the mismeasurement of
capital also varies depending on the marginal tax rate of the agents involved.
Extra corporate taxable income due to inflation is subject to the corporation
income tax rate, as are the extra deductions of nominal interest payments.
For individuals, the tax cost varies with their tax bracket. Thus, the
overall impact of inflation depends on the tax—induced distortion of
rates of return and agents' financial response to these distortions. Clearly
'a general equilibrium analysis is well-suited to this type of problem.
An indexed tax system would eliminate the distortionary effects of infla-
2
don by correctly measuring real capital income. In order to simulate the
effects of indexing, the GEFB model is re—solved for the equilibrium that would- 25-
obtainin the presence of a zero rate of inflation. Thiseffectively elimi—
nates any m5srneasurcment of capital income. Since the equilibrium underan
indexedtax system will be identical tothe equilibrium under an unindexed
taxsystemwhich has a zero rate of inflation, the simulation resultscan be
interpreted in either of two ways. The difference between the two equilibria
can be seen as either the effect of an indexed tax system, or as the effect
of six per cent inflation under an unindexed taxsystem.
With no adjustment in tax rates, the total federal taxrevenue declines
due to indexation by $28.2 billion, from $228.3 billion to $199.1 billion.28
This decrease consists almost entirely of a $27.8 decrease in individuaLincome
tax liability. The other component is a surprisingly small $0.4 reduction incor-
poration income tax paid. This small change is the net result of a few offsetting
factrs. First, the elimination of the excess tax due to historicalcost
depreciation and inventory accounting methods outweighs the elimination of
the deductibility of the inflation premium in nominal interestdeductions,
amounting to a $3.7 billion tax saving. The increase in the amount ofcorpor-.
ate capital is approximately offset by the decrease in the marginalproduct of
capital. Whatlargelyoffsets the $3.7 billion tax sving is a large decline
in the real riskiess interest rate. The reduced value of
interestdeductions due to this change causes the corporate tax bill to
increaseby over $2 billion. The combination of these factors yields the small
increase in corporate income tax liability.
In order to compare two tax systems with equal total yield, tax rates
must be raised under indexation. In the results reported below, all individual
income tax rates were multiplied by an identical factor; bracketswere
unchanged as was the corporationincome tax rate. This procedure required a— 26—
21.1percent increase in all personal tax rates, raising the first marginal
tax rate to .170 and the highest marginal rate to .848. This equi—yield procedure
is a crucial element in the simulation results reported below, since alternative
rate adjustments to make up the lost revenue would undoubtedly change the distribu-
tional impact of indexing, and could also affect its allocational implications.
The equilibrium solution under an indexed tax system is partially characterized
in Table 2. There is a substantial change in the pattern of rates of return in the
economy. First of all, there is a large decline in the real rate of return on
riskiess debt, from .044 to 035. Since inflation in an unindexed tax system
increases the personal taxation of debt relative to equity, indexation relieves
this excess taxation and thereby increases the positive demand for riskiess debt
by the lower—taxed classes, and also decreases the desired leverage of the
high income, high tax rate classes. Since the excess supply of riskless debt
by agents other than individuals is virtually fixed (government borrows a fixed
amount, and corporations borrow a fixed proportion of a slightly changing total
capital stock), the real rate of return on riskless debt must fall in order to
clear its market. The real rate of return on equity rises from .106 to.114,
indicating that the net effect of indexation is to render equity a relatively less
attractive investment, requiring a higher rate of return in equilibrium. That the
extra tax burden due to inflation is greater for debt than for equity is clearly
evidenced by the fact that the premium equity earns over debt is .062 without
indexing, and increases to .079 under indexationor, equivalently, in the absence
of inflation.
Another striking shift in the pattern of rates of return is the sharp increase
in the equilibrium yield on tax—exempt securities, which earn a real rate of return












inthe indexed, or non—inflationary, equilibrium. The differential between the real
return on taxable and tax—exempt debt decreases from .0428 to only .0102 in the
indexed equilibrium. The explanation here isquite straightforward. The issuers
of tax—exempt debt benefit from the mismeasurement and subsequent overtaxation of
thereal return on iaxable debt; this enables them to sell debt to high—tax bracket
individuals while offering nearly a zero real return. When this raismeasuretnent is
eliminated, state and local governments must increase their real interest payments
by more than two percent in order to have their outstanding debt willingly held.
Thesechanges inthe pattern of real returns are accompanied by substantial
shiftsin the portfolios of the income groups. Since the tax advantages to the
highly taxed groups of equity relative to debt diminish under indexing, the con-
centration of equity holdings might be expected to decline. This does in fact
occur, with the proportion of equity held by the top three income classes falling
— 27—
TABLE2
EQUILIBRIU2IVALUES OF KEY VARIABLES IN INDEXED ECONONIY
Expectedreal rate of return on Corporate Equity
Expected real rate of return on Food—Sector Capital
Expected real rate of return on Rental Housing
Expected real rate of return on Taxable Debt





Owner—Occupied Housing Stock— 28—
from43.9% to 37.5%. Another striking change in the portfolios of the high
income groups is the sharp decline in the amount of owner—occupied housing held.
Remember with nominal interest payments fully deductible from taxable income,
the opportunity cost of housing becomes very low under inflation in an unindexed
system. Individuals in high tax brackets respond by holding large amounts of
owner—occupied housing. Under indexing, even though the real rate of interest
declines, the opportunity cost of owned housing services increases significantly
for individuals in high tax brackets. In response, the amount of wealth put
into owrier-.occupied housing under indexing is just 69% of what it would be
under an unindexed system for the highest two income groups. On the other hand,
the low income groups experience a decline in the cost of owned housing services,
since the decline in the real interest rate more than compensates for the reduced
ialue of interest paid tax deductions. In response, they increase the amount that
they hold.
The decline in the high income groups' holdings of equity and owner—occupied
housing is offset primarily by a decline in their indebtedness and slightly by
increases in the position in the other risky assets. As noted above, in the
unindexed six percent inflation equilibrium, the top two income classes borrowed
an amount equal to 26.2% of their net wealth; in the equilibrium under indexing
the borrowing is reduced to 9.9% of net wealth.
-
Accordingto this simulation, the allocational impact of indexing would be
minimal, causing a slight decrease in the amount of capital in the owner—occupied
housing, largely at the expense of rental housing. This aspect of the simulation
results is especially sensitive to the specification of the model; in fact, in
earlier versions of this model (see Slemrod [1980]) indexing caused a much larger— 29—
shiftof capital away from owner—occupied housing. This earlier result
seems consistent with intuition, since indexing eliminates the deductibility
of nominal interest payients, and thus apparently raises the cost of housing.
Although in a model of this complexity it is difficult to trace a result to a
particular aspect of the model, the absence of such a shift in the present
version seems due to the following facts. First of all, the substantially lower
real rate of interest under indexation means that, for the lower—taxedgroups
who make up the bulk of owner—occupied housing demand, the opportunity cost of
owned housing declines. In fact, a comparison of the two equilibria shows that
the five lowest income groups find owned housing less expensive in the indexed
equilibrium; these five groups ownabout85% of all owned—housing. Thus the
ownership of housing shifts from high income to low income individuals, but the
total does not significantly decrease. A second reason is the fact that the
increased tax rates under indexation tend to lower the cost of owned housing
to all individuals, especially the highly—taxed groups who experience the
greatest absolute tax rate increase. Since this increases the value of deducting
interest payments from taxable income, the effect is to increase the demand
for owned housing.
The welfare effects of indexing are presented in Table 3. The numbers in
the first column refer to the dollar compensation that must be paid before
the resolution of the uncertainty in order to make the non—indexed inflationary
situation indifferent to the indexed situation. The usual, index number probleta
applies here, since the value of the required compensation depends on whether
it is to be paid (or received) in the pre—indexing or post—indexing situation..




































The simulation results indicate that a system of indexation,with lost
revenue made up by adjusting all personal tax rates upward by amultiplicative
factor, would cause an increase in welfare for the highestfive income groups,
and a decrease in welfare for the lowest four income groups, withthe dividing
income level being approximately $30,000 in annual income. Without an
explicit social welfare function to balance the gainsand losses, it is
impossible to say whether this would be a desirable changeto make. However,
the sum of the compensation values is clearly positive ($6.4 billion, orabout
one—half of one percent of national income adjusted for the disutilityof
risk) indicating that a compensation system could be arranged sothat indexation
would be a Pareto—optimal improvement. In that sense, indexationwould reduce





considerany dynamic efficiency effects of indexation.
There are several aspects to this increase in efficiency. First, there
is a small efficiency gain from the slight shift of capital away from owner—
occupiedhousing, which is over—supplied, due to the tax advantages it receives
even in the absence of inflation. Second, indexation tends to reduce the dis-
persion in the cost of owner—occupied housing, and thus reduces the inefficiency
that results from individuals facing different prices for the same good. In
the unindexed inflationary economy, the total cost of owner—occupied housing
ranged from $.094 per unit of housing service (where one unit of service is
produced by one unit of capital) to the lowest income group to $.029 for the
highest taxed group. In the indexed equilibrium, the range of prices is $.085
to $.047. Thus the owner—occupied housing stock is more efficiently distributed
under indexation, as there is less incentive for the high income groups to borrow
in order to hold housing.
A third source of the efficiency gain under indexation is the improved
allocation of risk—bearing. Since after—tax risk premiums are not the same
for all individuals, risk is not borne optimally. Inflation in an unindexed
system exacerbates this problem since it widens the dispersion of risk premia,
due to its differential impact on risky and riskiess assets. Thus under indexing,
this dispersion is reduced and risk is borne more efficiently.
The pattern of the distributional impact of inflation also has several
sources. First, indexation tends to reduce the total taxation of capital income.
In order to make up the lost revenue, all personal tax rates were increased.
Since labor income comprises the bulk of personal taxable income, the indexing
scheme is accompanied by a not insignificant shift in the tax burden from the— 32—
highincome classes to the low income classes, who have a much higher relative
endowment of labor versus capital. Thus the lowest four income classes, the
ones who apparently suffer under indexation, find their federal tax burden
increased by $6.44 billion under the indexed system, or an increase of 8.8%.
The highest two income classes of course face the highest increase in
tax rates under the general tax increase scheme, but their reduced taxable
income under indexation almost entirely cancels out this effect, so that in the
end they pay only $0.93 billion more in federal taxes, just 3.1% of their initial.
tax payments. However, it is important to keep in mind that the increased tax
rates also serve to reduce the after—tax variance of their risky capitalinvestments.
This plus the fact that under indexation these two classes hold a much less
levered portfolio implies that the disutility from risky income is substantially
lower in their optimal portfolios under indexation. These individuals also
substitute income—earning assets for a large chunk of their owner—occupied housing,
the marginal utility of which was very low. Finally the top two classes benefit
greatly from the increased real return earned by tax—exempt securities, which are
held almost exclusively by these individuals. The increase in their real yield
from .001 to .025 provides a transfer of approximately $2.4 billion from the
general public to these two classes.
At this point it is important to alert the reader that the results of
these simulations are meant to be illustrative of the kind of analysis this
kind of model can provide. The results are not seen as the final word on
the effects of indexation on the U.S. economy, owing to our lack of knowledge
about certain of the parameters and functional forms of the model, and also to
the sensitivity of the results to certain aspects of the model itself. For
example, sensitivity analysis not reported here indicates that the allocational— 33—
impactof indexation is sensitive to the modelling of the housing sector
and the distributional implications depend on the kind of equal—yield tax
adjustment that is assumed to be used as well as the relationship of the after—
tax variance of assets to the marginal tax rate. This model has a multitude
of dimensions to which sensitivity analysis could conceivably be applied. This
warning is meant to serve as a less cumbersomesubstituteto reporting these
results.
V.2. WithResponsive Corporate Financial Policy
Now the simulation of an indexed tax system is repeated, this time
allowing corporations to adjust their financial policy in response to the
changing tax environment. An earlier section discussed the methodology to be
used in calculating the corporate behavioral response. Note that the optimal
financial policy on which this methodology is based is independent of the rate
of inflation, and is therefore unaffected by indexing.29 Nevertheless, although
the indexing (or inflation) itself does not matter, certain changes in the
economy caused by the indexation scheme may cause corporations to alter their
financial decisions.Changes in the ownership of equity by income class will
alter the. taxcostof a given financial policy; indexation tends to reduce
the concentration of equity ownership among the higher income classes, and
thus reduce the tax advantage of debt and retentions. Other relevant factors
are any changes in the marginal tax rates on dividends, debt interest,
and capital gains. These changes may result either from changes in the
taxable income of the individuals or from changes in the taxrateschedule
needed to keep total tax revenues unchanged. The net effect of these in-
fluences will determine the direction and magnitude of the corporate financial
response.— 34—
Thesimulation results indicate that there would be very little adjust-
ment in corporate financial policy. The ownership of equity shifts toward
individuals with lower marginal tax rates, but the upward adjustment of all
tax rates to maintain equal yield offsets that to a large extent. In the
indexed equilibrium, theaggregatecorporate debt--capital ratio falls from
.419 to .378, and the payout ratio does not change at all.
The equilibrium looks very similar to that which is depicted in Table 2.
The only significant difference is that the real rate of return on equity is
.108 instead of .114. This difference is due to the fact that with a reduced
debt—equity ratio equity shares are less risky and therefore earn a lower risk
premium in equilibrium.
The distributional implications of indexing are also not substantially
changed by allowing corporations financial flexibility. The shift toward
equity and away from debt would be expected to benefit the higher—taxed
individuals, for whom the retention of earnings at the corporate level has
a sheltering effect, at the expense of the lower—taxed individuals. This is
exactly the pattern that the simulation results reveal. The top two income
classes benefit even more from indexing than Table 3 indicates, and the
lower seven classes fare slightly less well than that table suggests. In all
cases, since the corporate financial adjustment is not large, the difference
in results is not great; for that reason, the detailed results are not presented
here.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This research demonstrates the feasibility of integrating a structural
treatment of portfolio choice and financial markets with the standard multi—— 35*
sectorgeneral equilibrium model of taxation. The model developed here takes
account of the unsurprising fact that when there are changes in the taxation
of capital income, individuals will adjust their financial behavior in
response. A correct understanding of the effects of a tax change, including
its implications for total tax revenue, the allocation of production, and the
distributional impact, requires consideration of the general equilibrium impact
of this financial behavioral response.
The GEFB model is used to simulate the impact of a completely indexed tax
system. The simulation results should not be regarded as disposing of the
policy questions involved, owing to uncertainty about the values of several
parameters and the relatively simple formulations of the determinants of portfolio
choice and the U.S. financial structure. Nevertheless, the simulation results
point to significant financial adjustment in response to indexationor, conversely,
to inflation in an unindexed economy. A significant shifting of the location of
private risk—bearing accompanies a slight reallocation of the capital stock away
from owner—occupied housing toward its other uses and a substantial change in the
ownership of this stock by income class. Allinall, indexing the tax system of
an economy like the U.S. in 1977 seems to lead to an efficiency gain, slightly
hurts the lowest income classes, and substantially improves the welfare of the
highest income groups.
Further research is needed for a more complete understanding of the
relationship between taxation on the one hand and financial behavior and markets
on the other hand. The role and behavior of financial institutions should be
integrated into the modelling of individuals' behavior presented here.3° The
dynamic implications of introducing financial behavior into tax models is also
a promising topic for future investigation.Jo1 )1LtUd
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TABLEA—i
ENDOWMENT OF CAPITAL AND LABOR BY INCONE CLASS, 1977
Income Class Caal1i Labor 1 ion
$ 0-9,000 440.3 140.2
9-15,000 405.8 186.7
15-22,500 572.0 259.6





More than 300,000 162.7 6.2
Total 4238.5 1001.4
TABLEA-2
SRARESOF SPENDING ON FOOD, RENTAL, AND OWNED HOUSING
Income Class Food Rental Housing Owned Housing
$ 0-9,000 .206 .152 .070
9- 15,000 .176 .114 .059
15- 22,500 .167 .070 .081
22,500- 30,000 .159 .044 .095
30- 45,000 .145 .028 .091
45- 75,000 .128 .023 .085
75-150,000 .101 .020 .085
150-300,000 .076 .018 .085
More than 300,000 .058 .016 .085Joel SleEnrod
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FOOTN DIES
For earlier uses of this type of model, see Meade [l955 and Johnson
[l956.
2
For a discussion of the relative merits of general versus partial
equilibrium analyses of taxation, see McLure [l975.
The later versions of the model are the work of Don Fullerton, Shoven,
and Whalley.
In Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley [19791, corporations can adjust
their dividend policy in environments where dividends get preferential tax
treatment, but only the extreme alternative of 100 percent payout is considered.
Compare this to the result of standard general equilibrium models that
all individuals hold exactly the same mix of capital goods, which isclearly
counterfactual.
6
An example of such a production function is QK?LI'' ÷9K,where9
is stochastic.
In the case of a portfolio choice between one risky and one riskless
asset, the demand for the risky asset is given by:
K(rE_rB)
KE— 38
where E refers to the risky asset and B to the riskiess asset. The
coefficient is proportional to Pratt's measure of relative risk aversion.
Thegeneralizationto many assets is straightforward. See Friend and Blurne[19]5].
8
Since the discontinuous marginal tax rates of the actual tax system cause
problems for the solution algorithm, a smooth approximation of the tax table is used.
Of course not all taxpayers itemize deductions. To reflect this fact, the
average exogenous deduction amount is calculated including the standard deduction
for itemizers, and only a percentage of property tax and interest payments are
alloweds additional deductions. The percentage is chosen to approximate the
fraction of such payments which are made by itemizers, and varies by income class.
10
Nominal capital gains on all assets other than corporate equity are assumed
to be equal to the rate of inflation. The real value of corporate stock also
increases to the extent that earnings are retained within the corporation.
See Iiternal Revenue Service Proceedings 72—18 and James [1979].
12
Aaron and others have pointed out that although the production of housing
services is capital—intensive, production of the housing stock itself is
relatively labor—intensive; of all the major private sectors of the economy,
only finance and insurance had as high a fraction of direct labor requirements.
Analysis of this issue would require expanding the model to include the demand
for and production of capital goods; this looms beyond the scope of current
research aims.— 39—
13 . Two considerationsmotivate the introduction of this role for government.
The first is that in the absence of such a role, the individual must consider
the covariation between asset returns and relative prices in making his port-
folio decision. This is a significant complication the assiption of no
relative price uncertainty avoids. Second, and related, in the presence
of price uncertainty there is some ambiguity about how "risky" an asset is.
As Stiglitz [1969) has pointed out, even if the real output froni an invest-
ment were perfectly certain, fluctuations in outputs of other commodities
would still make the given investment risky, since both its relative price
and the marginal utility of income would vary. Under certain conditions a
sector with no technological uncertainty may experience greater uncertainty
in return than an industry which does have a stochastic production function.
Assuming no price uncertainty avoids this ambiguity.
14See pp. 69—97 for a more detailed treatment of the issues raised in
this section, and for alternative treatments of financial policy in this
model.
-
15The exact factor of increase is 2.92.
16In Harberger's original treatment and in the subsequent Shovenet.
papers, the unit of capital was defined as that amount which (in the assumed
equilibrium) earned one dollar of income net of all taxes. This procedure is
perfectly consistent with their model which ignores the differential riskiness— 40—
ofcapital, since then it is a condition of equilibrium
that the net return of each unit of capital be equalized. However, when risk
(and any other) differences in particular forms of capital are recognized,
this procedure is no longer valid. For example, the quantity of risky
capital which produces a given expected net return will be less than the
required quantity of riskless capital.
The long run equilibrium condition that would be observed in a
world with differential riskiness of capital is that each unit of capital be
valued the same. Since capital can move between sectors, any difference in
value would be incompatible with equilibrium. Thus, I have chosen to
represent a unit of capital as that quantity which in 1977 was valued at
one dollar.
17
This is an imperfect measure of the appropriate return to labor since
it does not include employer contributions for social insurance programs.
18
A more direct method of calculating private wealth yields a similar
figure. The 1977 net stock of fixed non—residential capital was valued by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis at $1.616 billion, residential capital at
$l.713 billion, and inventories at $0.506 billion, for a total of $3.835 bil-
lion. The value of federal, state, and local securities held by households
was reported by the Federal Reserve Board to be $0.234 billion, while the
amount held by private domestic non-government agents was $0.680 billion.
Since the procedure for precisely calculating private wealth in our
stylized model without financial institutions is not obvious, it must suffice
to show that a synthetic calculation using these figures will yield a number
not far from the $4.24 billion used in the model.— 41—
19
The 1972-3 brackets are inflated by a factor of 1.5, which is approximately
the factor of increase in per capita disposable personal income between 1977
and 1972-3. (The figure for 1977 is $6017 and the average of 1972 and 1973
is $4061).
20
The primary components of spending on owned dwellings as recorded by the
Consumer Expenditure Survey are interest on mortgages, property taxes, and
expenses for maintenance. This is a highly imperfect measure of the real
cost of owned housing services, since it ignores the opportunity cost of any
equity in the house,the tax deductibility of mortgage payments and property
taxes,the depreciation of the stock, and any increase in the nominal value
of the house. The reported cost of owned housing and the actual cost may
be compared at follows:
Reported Cost:HEV(rB+rT) ÷M+ t
ActualCost: H[rB_t(rB+1T) + N ÷D÷t(l-t)
Here H is the value of the house, y is the debt-capital ratio, rB is the
real riskless interest rate, -ris the anticipated rate of inflation, M is
the maintenance rate, D is the rate of depreciation, t is the property
tax rate, and t is the marginal rate of personal income tax.
By using estimated values of these parameters, we can find the ratio of
actual cost to reported cost for each income group. For y we use the ratio of
the value of outstanding household home mortgages to the net value of residential
housing in 1972, which is 0.527. We set rE to be .03,11at.045,14 at .0125,




By using the average marginal tax rate for people in each income class,
we can compute the conversion ratio above. This ratio applied to the CES
reported share of spending on owned dwellings yields the numbers reported in
Table A—2.
21
The income elasticity of food is taken to be .51, as estimated by
Houtthaker and Taylor [1970]. The income elasticities of rental and owner—
occupied housing in the upper income classes are assumed to be .70 and 1,
respectively. These numbers are compatible with the findings of Rosen [1978]
that the income elasticities of rental and owned housing were both .76, given
tenure choice, but that the probability of being an owner increased with income.
22
The source for the property tax payments and total assessed value is
Factsand Figures on Government Finance (The Tax Foundation, 1977). The
assessment ratio is from the 1972 Census of Governments.
23A value forof three is comparable to a coefficient ofrelativerisk
aversionof six. This is consistent with the recent findings of Friend and
Hasbrouck [1980], although earlier research (see Friend and Blume [1975]) found
values ox the order of two.
24
This calculation is derived by updating the average nominal rate of return
for 1926—1971 presented in Friend and Blume [1975], and subtracting the average
annualincrease in the consumer price index over the period.— 43—
25
Since the higher income brackets tend to ownlowerdividend—yielding
stocks, 37% of dividends received is certainly compatible with owning (at
least) 43.9% of all stock.
26
As time passes, inflation also pushes taxpayers into higher personal
tax brackets, increasing both marginal and average tax rates. This dynamic
aspect of an unindexed tax system is not treated in this exercise in comparative
statics.
27
The details of an indexing system need not concernushere.
For this exercise the shortfall in revenue is made up by a levy on individuals
that is proportional to their federal tax payments and is assumed to have no
substitution effects.
29
King [1978], PP. 111—112, shows that in models with one type of investor,
no bankruptcy costs, and no constraints on individual portfolios, the conditions
determining whether a firm should prefer debt or equity are unaffected by the
rate of inflation. However, this formulation is not compatible with the existence
of an optimal debt—equity ratio, either for the firm or for the economy as a whole.
In models of capital market equilibrium which feature optimal non—extreme financial
policies, the rate of inflation may have a direct impact on the equilibrium financial
structure of the firm and/or economy. (See for instance Auerbach and King [19801
and Gordon [1980]). However, at the moment there is no econometric evidence on the44 —
relationshipbetween inflation aridfinancialstructure that can be invoked
in this simulation model, and explicitly modelling the conditions which lead
to an interior equilibrium, such as constraints on borrowing or the existence
of bankruptcy costs, is beyond the scope of this present study.
30A first step toward a model with financial institutions is made in
Slemrod [1980], pp. 165—204.Joel Slernrod
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